UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1994/588
18 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FOURTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 911 (1994) of 21 April 1994 in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) until 22 October 1994 on the understanding that the Council would, by 18 May 1994, review the situation in Liberia, including the role played by UNOMIL in that country, based on a report by the Secretary-General. Specifically, the Council wished to be informed on progress with respect to the full installation of the Council of State of the Liberian National Transitional Government; progress on disarmament and demobilization; and the implementation of the peace process as a whole.

2. The installation of the Council of State of the Liberian National Transitional Government was to be within the time-frame stipulated by the Security Council, including the seating of the full cabinet and the Transitional Legislative Assembly to bring about a unified civil administration of the country and conditions for the preparation and holding of the national elections scheduled for 7 September 1994. The Security Council called on the parties to cease all hostilities and cooperate fully in facilitating the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country by the most direct routes.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

3. I am pleased to report that the Liberian parties have now succeeded in implementing one of the major tasks called for in the Cotonou agreement (S/26376) as well as in resolution 911 (1994), namely the full installation of the Council of State of the Liberian National Transitional Government. The Liberian National Transitional Government Cabinet was able to hold its first meeting on 13 May 1994 and issued a statement in which it expressed its profound gratitude to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), other African countries that have contributed troops, UNOMIL, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the entire international community for the support and assistance provided to Liberia, which has helped the country to reach the present stage of the peace process. The statement also called on leaders of all warring factions and armed

combatants to surrender unconditionally all their arms and other implements of war to the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and declared, inter alia, that the Liberian National Transitional Government was henceforth the government authority throughout the territory of Liberia. This has enabled the parties to bring to an effective end all factional claims to territory.

4. As I pointed out in my third progress report to the Council of 18 April 1994 (S/1994/463), the Liberian parties were experiencing some difficulties in agreeing to the allocation of certain key cabinet portfolios, namely defence, finance, foreign affairs and justice.

5. On 19 April 1994, after intense negotiations between the Council of State and the Liberian parties, the Council allocated the Ministry of Justice to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the Ministry of Defence to the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the Ministry of Finance to the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). The three Ministers were confirmed on 20 April 1994 by the Transitional Legislative Assembly and inducted by the Chairman of the Council of State.

6. In my continuing effort to assist the leadership of the Liberian National Transitional Government, I held a meeting on 19 April 1994 with one of its members, who briefed me on the progress made and the obstacles experienced in this process. For my part, I emphasized to him that Liberia must meet the deadline of 7 September 1994 for the holding of the elections. This required rapid progress in the complete installation of the Liberian National Transitional Government; in the seating of its full cabinet and National Assembly; and in disarmament and demobilization. All of these steps were necessary to establish appropriate conditions for the preparation and holding of the elections and to sustain the peace process in Liberia. I also emphasized that the international community was facing increasing difficulties in financing peace-keeping operations, including UNOMIL, especially if the impression was given that the parties concerned were not making the necessary efforts to solve their problems.

7. On 22 April 1994, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia announced its decision to permit the seating of its members in the Transitional Legislative Assembly and the swearing-in of those cabinet nominees whose posts were not in dispute. The Vice-Chairman of the Council (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) also resumed his activities in the Council.

8. On 30 April 1994, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in my absence from New York, discussed the situation in Liberia with President Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo of Benin, Chairman of ECOWAS. The meeting afforded an opportunity to reaffirm the excellent cooperation existing between ECOMOG and UNOMIL and to emphasize the need for progress in the implementation of the Cotonou agreement by the parties in Liberia within the time-frame approved by the Security Council. President Soglo confirmed that the outstanding problems between the parties in Liberia were being resolved. With respect to the electoral system, he welcomed the dispatch of the high-level electoral team that would advise the Liberian parties on the various possibilities.

9. On 11 May 1994, after further protracted negotiations involving the Council of State and the Liberian parties, the Council announced its decision to appoint the National Patriotic Front of Liberia nominee for the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. The newly appointed Minister is scheduled to be formally inducted on 19 May 1994. This resolution of the last of the four remaining ministerial posts has removed a major impediment to the full seating and functioning of the Transitional Government.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

10. At the time of my last report on 18 April 1994, a total of 2,200 combatants from the three parties had been disarmed and demobilized. During the period of negotiations between the parties on the distribution of the four remaining cabinet posts, the pace of disarmament slowed considerably. Nearly 2,900 combatants have now been disarmed. With the full installation of the Liberian National Transitional Government, the parties have recommitted themselves to the complete implementation of the Cotonou agreement, including disarmament. It is therefore expected that the pace of disarmament will quicken in the days and weeks to come. I therefore again call on the Liberian parties to respect the terms of the Cotonou agreement, commit themselves to a timetable for disarmament and ensure that their combatants lay down their arms.

11. As noted in my report of 18 April fighting had erupted in the eastern part of Liberia between the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Liberian Peace Council, an armed group formed after the signing of the Cotonou agreement. The Liberian National Transitional Government, UNOMIL and ECOMOG have intensified their efforts to bring about a cease-fire between the two groups and to bring the Liberian Peace Council into the disarmament and demobilization process. I will provide details of progress in this regard in my next report to the Security Council.

12. In my third progress report (S/1994/463), I had also referred to the mediation efforts by ECOMOG and UNOMIL to resolve the dispute between the Chairman of ULIMO and the ULIMO Field Commander. This dispute had resulted in an outbreak of fighting among the ULIMO forces along ethnic lines. Since 6 May 1994, under the auspices of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, there have been daily meetings between the two groups to resolve this dispute. A cease-fire agreement between the groups in ULIMO was initially signed on 6 May 1994 by their respective front-line commanders. The two groups also reaffirmed their commitment to the Cotonou accord and its full implementation. On 9 May 1994, ULIMO's President Al Haji Kromah and General Roosevelt Johnson signed an agreement in the presence of the representatives of UNOMIL and ECOMOG confirming the agreement of 6 May. The conflict had prevented ULIMO's participation in the Council of State and the agreement thus paved the way for its effective participation in the Liberian National Transitional Government. The agreement also facilitated the reopening of the roads and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the south-western region.

IV. ELECTORAL PROCESS

13. I had indicated in my progress report of 18 April 1994 that I intended to send a team of international experts to consult with the Liberian National Transitional Government and the Liberian Elections Commission on how best the United Nations could assist in the conduct of the elections.

14. This team, which will arrive in Liberia on 22 May 1994, is scheduled to stay in the country for two weeks. As stated in my earlier report, the team will be advising the Elections Commission to enable it to determine the modalities of the electoral system to be used. The terms of reference for the electoral team are accordingly:

(a) To discuss with officials of the Liberian National Transitional Government and the Elections Commission the efficacy of various electoral systems, in particular, the system of proportional representation and the experiences of various countries that have applied this system;

(b) To provide advice to political parties, other national governmental and non-governmental organizations and Liberians on the various options for electoral systems that may be considered for use in Liberia;

(c) To review the Constitution of Liberia and the related electoral regulations and, in this context, to provide advice and guidance on the constitutional, legislative and other implications of particular options;

(d) To advise on the steps that might contribute to increasing public awareness through the widespread dissemination of information on various electoral systems by stimulation of local, regional and national discussion through the public media, public seminars and discussion forums.

V. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

15. Provided that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is inducted on 19 May 1994 as scheduled, the progress described in the present report provides a reasonable basis for optimism that the Liberian National Transitional Government, with the help of the international community, may soon succeed in resolving the tragic conflict that has caused so much suffering to the people of Liberia and the destruction of the country.

16. The overall efforts of the parties in Liberia, with the assistance of UNOMIL and ECOMOG, are now finally yielding some positive results. Nevertheless much remains to be accomplished by the Liberian National Transitional Government, especially in the areas of disarmament and demobilization, and there is no room for complacency. I call on Member States to support the Liberian National Transitional Government in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Cotonou accord. In this context, I have instructed my Special Representative on Liberia to advise me on concrete measures that Member States may take in this regard. I shall continue to keep the Council fully informed of the situation in Liberia and of the progress being made in the implementation of the Cotonou agreement.

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18 May 1994
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LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement of the Government of the Russian Federation of 14 May 1994 concerning the agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces signed on the same date in Moscow by the Georgian and Abkhaz parties (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. VORONTSOV

Annex

Statement by the Government of the Russian Federation of 14 May 1994

The Government of the Russian Federation welcomes the signature on 14 May 1994 in Moscow by the parties to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of an agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces.

An important step has been taken towards achieving a lasting peace. However, the process of step-by-step political settlement must continue. The security zone provided for under the agreement, in which it is proposed that a peace-keeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States should be deployed, must make it possible to prevent military actions from being resumed and open the way for the thousands of refugees to return to their permanent places of residence, particularly in the Gali district.

The Russian Federation is convinced that the parties to the conflict will scrupulously fulfil the obligations they have entered into. The breaches of agreements that have occurred in the past must not be repeated. Russia, for its part, is fully aware of its responsibility and is willing, together with the United Nations, to cooperate in achieving a comprehensive settlement and ensuring that the current phase is followed by further efforts to restore peace and mutual understanding in the region.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 26 of the preliminary list*
COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN
MILITARY FORCES FROM THE
TERRITORIES OF THE BALTIC STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 18 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention the text of a statement dated 9 May 1994, by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the statement circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 26 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ernst JAAKSON
Permanent Representative

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

Annex

Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia
dated 9 May 1994

At a press conference that took place in Moscow on 6 May, the Russian Federation's Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, stated that the Russian Federation will keep its forces in Estonia as long as it deems necessary and even reserves the right to bring in more troops if necessary.

This kind of statement by the Russian Defence Minister can be classified as a direct threat to Estonian independence and sovereignty.

Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations, the Russian Federation has made a commitment to withdraw its troops from Estonia, without any connection to any other issue. The 31 August 1994 date was offered by the Russian Federation itself. Likewise, the Russian Federation has no basis for tying the withdrawal of troops from Estonia to the withdrawal of troops from Latvia and Lithuania.

I hope that this statement by Defence Minister Pavel Grachev represents his personal opinion and not the Russian Federation's official position. In this connection, I have directed our Ministry of Foreign Affairs to request an explanation from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the hopes that the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry will refute Defence Minister Pavel Grachev's irresponsible and tension-producing statement.

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18 May 1994

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LETTER DATED 18 MAY 1994 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 17 May 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Mr. Hassan A. Hassanov, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Letter dated 17 May 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I consider it necessary to bring to your attention information about new aspects in the development of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict which throw light on the annexationist plans of the Republic of Armenia in relation to the Azerbaijani Republic.

According to our information, at the current time the leadership and also a number of political parties and public organizations of Armenia are carrying out active work among the population of the Republic with a view to resettling a certain part of the population in territories of the Azerbaijani Republic seized by the Armenian armed forces in the Kelbajar, Kubatly and Zangelan districts.

This work is being directed by Vazgen Sarkisyan, Minister of State of the Republic of Armenia, General Suren Abramyan, his deputy, and the State Directorate of Refugee Affairs. In order to make this campaign public in nature, the so-called "Airudzi" charitable alliance has been established under the auspices of the Armenian monarchic party; it has allocated a large sum for financing the programme and has undertaken to provide fully for the settlers. The Government, in turn, has taken a decision to issue a large loan to the settlers and grant them extensive privileges - ranging from the allocation of plots of land to exemption from military service in the zone of military operations in Nagorny Karabakh. There are plans to establish Armenian military settlements in the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic.

The implementation of this programme at the level of a minister of State, his deputy and the state department of Armenia shows that the resettlement of the Armenian population in occupied districts of the Azerbaijani Republic is being carried out on an organized basis under the direct control of the leadership of the Republic of Armenia and forms part of its State policy aimed at the territorial dismemberment of Azerbaijan.

These illegal actions of the Republic of Armenia once again demonstrate:

(a) The desire of the Republic of Armenia to consolidate the results of the military aggression and annexation of occupied territories of the Azerbaijani Republic through intensive settlement of those territories;

(b) Armenia's intention to bring about irreversible demographic changes in the region and hinder the possible future return of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani refugees to their native lands;

(c) Blatant disregard for Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) calling for the cessation of hostilities and the complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from

the territories seized in the Azerbaijani Republic, and also the establishment of conditions for the return of refugees;

(d) The unwillingness of the Armenian side to proceed to a peaceful settlement of the bloody conflict which has already lasted for more than six years and its desire to delay the negotiating process and conserve the current situation in the territories of the Azerbaijani Republic occupied by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia.

In the light of the foregoing, and taking into account the serious consequences for the process of peaceful settlement which might derive overall from the implementation of the illegal plans of the leadership of the Republic of Armenia, I request you to consider the possibility of sending a United Nations fact-finding mission in the very near future to the Republic of Armenia and the occupied districts of the Azerbaijani Republic indicated above in order to investigate the situation on the spot and avert possible adverse consequences in a timely manner.

(Signed) Hassan HASSANOV

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18 May 1994

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 16 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Mr. Edward W. Gnehm, Jr. has been appointed deputy representative of the United States on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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19 May 1994
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION CONCERNING HAITI

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in pursuance of paragraph 5 of resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994, which "requests that the Secretary-General, having regard for the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, report to the Council not later than 19 May 1994 on steps the military have taken to comply with actions required of them by the Governors Island Accord 1/ as specified in paragraph 18 below".

2. In paragraph 18 the Council:

> "Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 16 above, measures in the present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions will not be completely lifted until:
>
> "(a) The retirement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, and the resignation or departure from Haiti of the Chief of the Metropolitan Zone of Port-au-Prince, commonly known as the Chief of Police of Port-au-Prince, and the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed Forces;
>
> "(b) Completion of the changes by retirement or departure from Haiti in the leadership of the police and military high command called for in the Governors Island Agreement;
>
> "(c) Adoption of the legislative actions called for in the Governors Island Agreement, as well as the creation of a proper environment in which free and fair legislative elections can be organized in the framework of the full restoration of democracy in Haiti;
>
> "(d) The creation by authorities of the proper environment for the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH);
>
> "(e) The return in the shortest time possible of the democratically elected President and maintenance of constitutional order,
>
> "these conditions being necessary for the full implementation of the Governors Island Agreement."

3. Having had regard for the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), I regret to inform the Council that there has been no change in the attitude of the Haitian military, who have not taken any steps to comply with paragraph 18 of resolution 917 (1994). On the contrary, the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces supported the attempt to replace illegally the legitimate President of Haiti, an attempt that was strongly condemned on 11 May 1994 by the members of the Security Council (S/PRST/1994/24) and by the Permanent Council of OAS. 2/

Notes

1/ See S/26063.

2/ CP/Dec.18 (986/94).

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19 May 1994

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LETTER DATED 18 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LIBERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to forward herewith a statement issued on 17 May 1994 by the Government of Liberia concerning recent developments in the peace process.

I should be grateful were you to have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) William BULL
Permanent Representative

Annex

Liberian Government statement on the peace process dated 17 May 1994

The Liberia National Transitional Government, the Government on the ground, comprising all of the parties to the Liberian civil conflict, has determined, in furtherance of the Liberian peace process, to do a review of the status of the Liberian situation and thereby be a part of the international assessment process through the presentation of this document, which is to be a part of the permanent records of the United Nations. We believe this to be necessary also for a fuller informed understanding and appreciation of the problems and difficulties that are unfolding in Liberia, the reasons therefor and the attempts by the Government to find solutions thereto.

It is just over two months and one week since 7 March 1994, when the Council of State of the Liberia National Transitional Government was sworn into office. The birth of the Liberia National Transitional Government was the direct result of the 25 July 1993 Cotonou accord (S/26272, annex) and the 15 February 1994 Monrovia communiqué (S/1994/187, annex), signed by the three major parties to the Liberian civil conflict (Interim Government of National Unity, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia/National Patriotic Reconstruction Government and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia). The Cotonou accord was one in a series of attempts by Liberians, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations to bring peace to war-torn Liberia, after numerous previous failed attempts.

As you may know, the accord contained two major components: the military and the political. The political component of the accord, in addition to providing for the structure of the new transitional Government, also provided that the Government would be seated within one month of the signing of the accord, concomitantly with the beginning of the disarming of the parties and their combatants.

On 15 February 1994, following the completion of the arrival of the United Nations observers and certain contingents of the expanded ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) forces and discussions held among the three parties to the Cotonou accord, a communiqué was issued in Monrovia, stating specifically that the Liberia National Transitional Government would be seated on 7 March 1994 and that on the same day disarming of the parties and their combatants would begin.

In accordance with the provisions of the accord and the Monrovia communiqué, the Council of State was seated on 7 March 1994. Following its seating, the Council began the task of nominating and appointing Cabinet ministers, designated by the parties to the accord, to the various ministerial portfolios of the Government in accordance with the provisions of the Cotonou accord. To date, all of the Cabinet positions envisioned by the Cotonou accord, including Foreign Affairs, Finance, Justice and Defence, have been filled. The Government has also determined, in addition, in an exercise of trade-offs to keep the peace process moving, to reactivate a few other ministerial portfolios

not mentioned in the course of the Cotonou negotiations, which have been determined necessary to take the process forward fully and as agreed to by all of the members of the Council of State in consultation with the parties to the accord. Those portfolios include the Ministry of Rural Development, the Minister of State without Portfolio and the Director-General of the Cabinet.

Following the conclusion of the Cabinet appointments specified in and envisioned by the Cotonou arrangements, the Cabinet was called into session and held its first meeting on Friday, 13 May 1994. At this first meeting of the Cabinet, at which there were in attendance Cabinet ministers designated by all of the parties, a declaration was issued announcing that the Liberia National Transitional Government was the sole Government of Liberia and that it had authority and jurisdiction over the entire country. The statement also called for all of the parties to the accord and those not parties to it to hand their arms over to ECOMOG, under the supervision of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The Cabinet determined further that arrangements should now be made for members of the Council and relevant government officials to commence visiting the various subregional areas of Liberia. Consistent with the outlook of the Cabinet, the Council is in the process of formulating and concluding the criteria for the appointment of local government officials throughout the country so that its presence can be felt in all areas of the country. Those appointments are expected to be concluded in the next several days. With those appointments, the process for the Liberia National Transitional Government assuming full control of the country should be completed.

A full budget for the entire country is now under review and should be concluded shortly. Of course, the obligations in the budget are premised on the expectation that the Government will shortly have not only authority over the entire country but control over all the resources of the country. Unless this happens, many of the projections in the budget will fall short, including obligations that the Government is prepared to undertake in respect of the electoral process.

In addition, since the seating of the Council, it has inducted into office the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker and members of the Transitional Legislative Assembly and that body is fully functioning. It has sworn into office the fifth and last Justice of the Supreme Court, thereby enabling the Court to be fully constituted and to operate at its full capacity in the hearing of cases and the administration of justice.

The Elections Commission has witnessed the appointment of two additional commissioners, one from the former Interim Government of National Unity, to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of a former Interim Government appointee to the Commission, and the other from the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia. The Commission now has an operating membership of six. The seventh Commissioner is still awaited from the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, but this has not stopped the Commission from commencing and proceeding with its activities, preparatory to the holding of free and fair elections as stipulated in the Cotonou accord. Thus the Commission has already submitted a budget for the consideration of the Council; it has held a series of meetings with the Council; a member of the Council has

been designated to have oversight responsibility for the Commission and the electoral process; and the Government has already given an initial amount of US$ 100,000 to the Commission for the commencement of its programmes and activities even whilst its budget is under consideration.

In addition to the above, the Government has commenced the payment of five months' salary arrears to civil servants. This is part of the process designed by the Government to take full charge of the national public bureaucracy and by such moves make the peace process less problematic; for, as perceived by the Council, the payment of salary arrears to public servants will have the impact of having civil servants not be influenced to take up arms or align themselves with those persons bent on pursuing a war posture in violation of the Cotonou accord and other instruments executed to bring the civil conflict in Liberia to an end.

The military portion of the accord, on the other hand, called for, among other things, the encampment, disarming and demobilization of the various parties to the conflict by ECOMOG, under the monitoring eyes of UNOMIL. The provisions of the accord relating to the activities mentioned herein were reinforced by the Monrovia communiqué of 15 February 1994, which stipulated that ECOMOG and UNOMIL should be fully deployed throughout the length and breadth of Liberia by 7 March 1994, the date of the seating of the Liberia National Transitional Government, and that the disarming of the combatants should commence on that date simultaneously with the seating.

Notwithstanding the fact that there had not been full deployment of UNOMIL and hardly any deployment of ECOMOG in the areas of the warring parties except those under the civil administration of the Interim Government of National Unity, and because of the prodding of the United Nations, with the agreement of ECOMOG and other friendly countries that asserted that the seating of the Liberia National Transitional Government would encourage the parties to permit the deployment of ECOMOG and UNOMIL forces in their areas and to begin the disarming of their men, the Council of State, the head of the executive branch of the Liberia National Transitional Government, was seated on 7 March 1994. As stated earlier, the other branches of the Government were similarly seated within several days thereafter.

Notwithstanding the achievements made with respect to the political aspect of the Cotonou accord, the military aspect failed miserably to move forward. There were tremendous obstacles created by the parties to the implementation of this part of the accord. After the symbolic commencement of a disarmament exercise, the parties halted all further moves in that direction. The first excuse was that the Government had not been fully constituted since the Cabinet portfolios had not been filled with all of the nominees designated by the parties, especially the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. That problem has now been resolved.

To date, however, notwithstanding the progress on the political front, disarmament continues to be mere symbolism for the parties to the accord; their Transitional Legislative Assembly members are operating and constitute the Legislative Assembly or branch of the Government; their nominees are operating both in the Supreme Court and on the Elections Commission. In short, although

the parties now constitute and make up what is known as the Liberia National Transitional Government, they have shown very little inclination to disarm in earnest, being determined to keep the disarmament at the level of mere symbolism. Indeed, some are now saying outright that they will not proceed with any further disarmament. Thus, after more than two months and one week from the date of seating of the Council of State and although the entire Government is now in place and should have full control over the entire country, just over 2,000 of the estimated 60,000 plus combatants have disarmed.

Several reasons are now pointed to as being responsible for this very slow pace or no movement in the disarmament process, cardinal amongst which are (a) the continued distrust among some of the parties, both of each other and of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, in spite of the fact that the parties now together constitute the Government; (b) interfactional or internal rivalries within one or more of the parties for positions in the Government; and (c) the continued fighting among some of the parties and/or among some of the parties and other armed groups not parties to the accord. Thus, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia has said that, as long as the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia continues its internal fights between the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups that form the two major groups of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia and as long as the Liberian Peace Council continues to bear arms against it, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia will not disarm. The Krahn ethnic stock of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia has said that it will continue to fight the Mandingo ethnic stock of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia as long as the recommendations of persons made by the Chairman of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (who is Mandingo) to high-level posts in the Liberia National Transitional Government continues to hold. The Krahns have demanded that major changes be made to the list of personnel recommended to the Cabinet by the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia and who have already been nominated to the Transitional Legislative Assembly or confirmed and appointed to various portfolios. The Chairman of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia has refused to meet this demand. As a result of this, serious armed fighting has erupted between the two groups, resulting in the loss of many lives, both of combatants and of innocent civilians. Both groups have said that they will not disarm as long as the rivalries continue. There are very few signs that the rivalries will soon subside, in spite of the efforts being made by various persons and groups and institutions, including the Council of State, through one of its members, and ECOMOG.

The National Patriotic Front of Liberia maintains also that as long as the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia does not disarm because of the internal rivalries, it will not disarm. Moreover, it insists that the Liberian Peace Council must first be disarmed before it would agree to disarm. More recently, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia has insisted that, because it does not consider ECOMOG to be neutral, it will not hand over its arms to ECOMOG. Instead, it has said, it wants a new 5,000-man army constituted, composed of the three warring parties in the following numbers: National Patriotic Front of Liberia, 2,000; Armed Forces of Liberia, 1,500; and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, 1,500. It is only to this new army, says the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, that it would hand over its arms. No reference is made to the Liberia National Transitional

Government in which, except for the Council, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia holds a majority. Such a proposition hardly seems possible or plausible, given even the current ethnic rivalries within the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia. Moreover, given that all of those bodies have been accused of serious human rights abuses and atrocities, any such proposition could lead to situations very similar to the one that now exists in other areas of the world where there are internal conflicts.

In this unfortunate situation and given the obstacles created by the parties, ECOMOG and UNOMIL have experienced serious difficulties in deciding upon a precise and decisive course in the matter of disarmament. And when they have spoken, the parties have not tended to show seriousness, and in some cases have even offered resistance, in carrying out the disarming of their forces. The impression is clearly given that the parties can continue to go on holding their arms and to use them in the commission of human rights abuses and atrocities against innocent civilians, and that there is not likely to be any intervention even to halt such abuses.

The Liberia National Transitional Government is seriously concerned about the reported abuses being perpetrated by the various parties against innocent civilians and believes that, unless and until ECOMOG and UNOMIL decide upon some decisive action, those abuses are likely to continue. If such abuses are not now checked, we could find ourselves in a similar situation as in other places where widespread killings have been perpetrated against innocent civilians, merely because of their ethnic background.

It is important therefore that the parties to the accord be warned that they could face severe action if they do not permit the disarming of their forces to commence; not only must they respect the human rights of civilians but human rights abuses against innocent civilians will not be tolerated; and the parties will not be permitted free movement across points to commit those acts or to challenge the disarmament process. Until this occurs, the Government may not be able to exert full control throughout the country, a precondition for the holding of free and fair elections, commence the massive repatriation of Liberian citizens who are refugees in foreign parts or see that local government administration is fully established and local government officials operate effectively when appointed by the Liberia National Transitional Government to the administration of the counties.

It is the hope of the Liberia National Transitional Government that, as a result of the review, the United Nations will determine to apply greater pressure on the warring parties to disarm, that ECOMOG and UNOMIL will be called upon to take a more decisive stand in moving the disarmament process forward and that more support, particularly logistical and other material support, will be provided to ECOMOG to enable the disarmament and election exercises to be carried out within the time-frame specified by the Cotonou accord or close thereto; and that the United Nations will continue to provide Liberia with humanitarian assistance, for which this Government is most appreciative.

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19 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to the information provided by my Government regarding the complete lack of progress by the insurgent Serb authorities in implementing the Zagreb cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 (S/1994/535), and the tragic development in Daruvar, where five civilians were summarily executed by Serbian extremists on 11 May 1994 (S/1994/578), I wish to inform the Council regarding the recently outlined plans of the insurgent Serb authorities in Knin to integrate the occupied territory in the Republic of Croatia (United Nations protected areas (UNPAs)) into the legal system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

According to the "Proposal for the Programme of the New Government of 'RSK'" (occupied territory or UNPAs in Croatia which the insurgent Serb authorities in Knin refer to as the Republic of Serbian Krajina) presented by "prime minister" Borislav Mikelic at the "parliament" session of 20 April 1994, the number one priority of his "Government" is the "integration of the [occupied territory or UNPAs] into the monetary and economic system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the 'Srpska Republic'" (self-declared Bosnian Serb Republic).

The plans of the insurgent Serb authorities in Knin, as presented by Mr. Mikelic, are in serious violation of all relevant Security Council resolutions and may jeopardize the peace process in Croatia and in the entire region. Excerpts from Mr. Mikelic's statement are as follows (excerpts are numbered by this writer for reference):

1. "Our negotiating position is and will be territorial integrity and sovereignty of the [occupied territory or UNPAs]. The [UNPAs] will sooner or later unite with the 'Srpska Republic' and Serbia and Montenegro into a unified State."

2. "Reintegration of [UNPAs] into Croatia is wishful thinking, an empty wish of the Croatian leadership. ... I would like to tell the Croatian leaders from this very position, that today, more than ever, Serbs in [UNPAs] are resolute not to live in a joint State with Croatia, and that they will link their destiny

with the Serbs in the 'Srpska Republic' and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."

3. "In that framework, the issue of Vukovar needs special treatment. Actually, we should demand that all financial concessions granted by the United Nations for reconstruction of Vukovar and directed into Croatia, be redirected to the [insurgent Serb authorities in Knin] in order that the reconstruction of Vukovar begins."

4. "Signing of the [Zagreb cease-fire] agreement and the subsequent deployment of the peace-keeping forces along the separation lines requires [that] special attention be given to defense matters. ... Implementation of the [Zagreb cease-fire] agreement is to be understood only as one positive step which will enable us to establish a joint defense system, together with the [Bosnian Serb army] and with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."

5. "Regarding the overall national plan, this generation has the mission to finalize the unification of Serbs in their overall ethnic territories."

6. "The strategic task is orientation of the economy in [UNPAs] towards the economy of Serbia, and [then] presentation to the world market. ... Links with the banking system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are being established, and they are showing first results. ... We must keep in mind that industry as well as the whole economy was connected with the Croatian economy. Now we are trying to establish connection with the 'Srpska Republic' and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). ... The previous 'Governments' established three companies: Kninex, Consortium and Krajina Consulting. Their task was to expedite the process of connecting the [UNPAs] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) economies and to control it."

7. "The current circumstances and relations between powers in the world still do not permit formal uniting of all Serb lands. That is not hindering us in building the economy of the [UNPAs] as an integral part of the unified economic system in Serb territories. ... The formal conception of unification of the economic and monetary system has to be performed through unified legislation. Practically, the attitude has to be based on factual unification of [UNPAs] with Serbia, based on a federal concept according to which [UNPAs] would be one of the republics."

8. "The attempt to establish a self-reliant economic and monetary system in [UNPAs] two years ago, was followed by many mistakes. ... The new programme will be based on implementation of the same, and I wish to emphasize, the same monetary programme as in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."

9. "The monetary system in [UNPAs] will be implemented on the basis of agreement with respective bodies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the 'Srpska Republic' and [insurgent Serb authorities in Knin]. It is necessary to assure that the Yugoslavia National Bank becomes the only bank of issue, the Central Bank, in the monetary system. ... The Central Bank will have exclusive, unified controlling functions, which means control of money

transactions, and control of the legal aspects of banking operations and of other money transactions."

10. "A decrease of wood exports from Russia and Canada is expected, and that gives an opportunity for an increase in Yugoslavia's export. Taking into account the economic blockade of Yugoslavia, [we] need to explore possibilities to export, either through the United Nations - talks on those issues have started - or in any other way that develops."

11. "There are three airports in [UNPAs]: Udbina, Zeljava and Klisa. The Udbina airport is used by the [Bosnian Serb army], the airport in Klisa is used by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the airport in Zeljava, one of the most modern military airports in Europe, was destroyed."

12. "Immediately after the outbreak of war all communications from [UNPAs] with the outside world were cut. ... During the last two years public firms responsible for the post and telecommunications invested major efforts and realized profit, mainly from services for UNPROFOR."

13. "Over the last two years [UNPAs] have suffered a shortage of electricity. With comprehensive assistance from Serbia, the transmitting system has been reconstructed."

14. "The oil industry in [UNPAs], in Mirkovci (NIK Enterprise) produced 138,000 cubic meters of oil last year. The company has three pumping fields, Deletovci, Ilaca and Sremske Laze, with 736 employees. Our estimates are that the wells that are not operating have the capacity to produce 151 cubic meters per day. The plan for this year is to make operational several new wells and to increase production."

15. "The court structure has to be complementary to the court system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This is a direct consequence of the proposal for factual unification with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It means that respective Ministries in [UNPAs] are functionally connected with the ministries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."

16. "Five hundred beds are available in the Plitvice resort. The plans are to present the tourist offer to the Serbs from the diaspora and to UNPROFOR."

It is the intention of my Government to bring this information before the Council so that the Members of the Council can be fully aware of the acts that are directly threatening the security and territorial integrity of Croatia, a Member State of the United Nations. Therefore, my Government urges the Council to consider seriously what other measures may be necessary so that the desired results in respect of UNPAs are found in a timely manner, consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

In view of the obvious intention by the insurgent Knin authorities not to accept the second stage of the European action plan, the economic reintegration into Croatia, and the third stage, the political reintegration into Croatia, my Government reserves its right to reconsider the renewal of the present UNPROFOR

mandate in Croatia, if the present mandate does not incorporate action consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions, and if the present mandate will only serve to preserve the status quo.

Moreover, my Government strongly urges the members of the Council to seriously consider how some actions by UNPROFOR, in view of the information in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 14 and 16 above, may obstruct the peace process promoted by the Council, and how certain UNPROFOR actions may violate the Council's resolutions.

May I request your assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 64 of the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 17 May 1994 from the representatives of Ukraine and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to transmit to you the text of the joint statement issued by the Vice-President of the United States of America and the Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine on 13 May 1994 in Washington.

We should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under item 64 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the United States

(Signed) Volodymyr D. KHANDOGY
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of
Ukraine to the United Nations

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE VICE-PRIME MINISTER OF UKRAINE AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DATED 13 MAY 1994

The United States and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment to building a relationship based on partnership and mutual trust and respect between their two countries and to continuing to build a new relationship in security and defence matters that reflects the end of the cold war. In this regard, the United States and Ukraine recognize the importance of fulfilling their obligations under the START Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, the January 1994 trilateral statement and the bilateral commitments these two countries have made to each other regarding the elimination of strategic offensive arms and assistance to be provided for this purpose.

Ukraine welcomes the United States progress in reducing strategic offensive arms. As the first step towards meeting the reductions required by the START Treaty, the United States has already removed over 3,500 nuclear warheads from over 780 intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Within the next few months, all warheads will have been taken off United States ballistic missiles whose launchers will be eliminated under this Treaty. Ukraine also notes with satisfaction that, as a reflection of the improved international security environment, by 30 May United States strategic ballistic missiles will no longer be targeted on Ukraine or any other country.

The United States strongly supports the Verkhovna Rada's and President Kravchuk's commitment that Ukraine accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State in the shortest possible time, and underscores its willingness to assist in helping Ukraine to eliminate strategic offensive arms located in Ukraine. The United States welcomes the progress in the process of deactivation of missiles on Ukrainian territory, and in accordance with the trilateral statement, 180 nuclear warheads have been transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation for dismantlement. The United States also welcomes the beginning of the process of delivery from the Russian Federation of fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants in Ukraine, in accordance with the trilateral statement.

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19 May 1994

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LETTER DATED 19 MAY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have considered your report of 5 May 1994 (S/1994/542) about the situation in Tajikistan and the efforts that you and your Special Envoy, Ambassador R. Piriz-Ballon, have been undertaking to promote political dialogue between the Tajik parties, aimed at achieving national reconciliation.

The members of the Council have asked me to convey to you their full support for your efforts and those of your Special Envoy in addressing the three clusters of issues identified by the Tajik parties, which are related to the achievement of national reconciliation: those of a political settlement; the solution of the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons; and fundamental institutional issues. They are encouraged, as you are, by the outcome of the first inter-Tajik talks in Moscow, in which both parties reaffirmed their commitment to political dialogue as the only means of achieving national reconciliation. The members of the Council concur with your observation that it is important to capitalize on the momentum achieved in Moscow in order to make the political dialogue irreversible.

The members of the Council commend the role of the Russian Federation in organizing and holding the first round of negotiations in Moscow. They also note with appreciation the valuable help provided to this end by regional and other countries attending the talks as observers. They are hopeful that the second round of talks that your Special Envoy is preparing to undertake would consolidate the gains made in the first round of talks. In this connection, they appeal to the Tajik parties to cooperate fully with you, your Special Envoy and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Tajikistan to advance the process of negotiations and the reconciliation of the Tajik nation and to refrain from any action that could obstruct this process.

The members of the Council look forward to receiving your next report on the situation in Tajikistan.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
President of the Security Council

94-22255 (E) 190594

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S/1994/598
20 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 MAY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF GREECE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a declaration by the European Union on Rwanda.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adamantios Th. VASSILAKIS
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Declaration dated 16 May 1994 by the European Union on Rwanda

The European Union, recalling its declaration of 18 April 1994 on Rwanda, again appeals urgently to all parties to the conflict to bring an end to the genocide now taking place in the country.

The European Union expresses its full support for the United Nations humanitarian efforts and, in this context, welcomes the resolution that is currently before the Security Council. The European Union looks forward to an urgent decision on measures which can be implemented soon.

The European Union welcomes the initiative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to conduct a mission to both Rwanda and Burundi and supports the call for a special meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

The European Union expresses its appreciation and support for the efforts of the Organization of African Unity and to President Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania for their initiatives in convening a regional conference, to which both the authorities of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) will be invited.

The European Union urges the two sides to agree on the need to respect the Arusha agrement, which, by way of negotiation, offers the best available basis for national reconciliation. In this context, the European Union supports the call for the early imposition of an arms embargo against Rwanda, and calls on all concerned to refrain from any action that is liable to exacerbate the situation.

The European Union is eager to increase its humanitarian aid wherever such aid can be brought to the populations that have suffered so cruelly from the violence. In this respect it will continue its immediate assistance to refugees in the neighbouring countries and will endeavour to assist equally the stricken populations within Rwanda, whenever conditions permit.

The European Union decided on 6 May 1994 to dispatch a mission of the Troika, on a Development Ministers level, to visit as soon as possible the countries neighbouring Rwanda, with a view to evaluating the humanitarian situation vis-à-vis the influx of refugees.

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S/1994/599
20 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I regret to inform you that yesterday and today, once again, Serbian forces shelled civilian targets as well as the airport in the "safe area" of Tuzla, using heavy artillery and tanks. This shelling is in direct violation of resolutions 824 (1993), 836 (1993) and 913 (1994) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ultimatum issued on 22 April 1994. We must ask why the provisions of these resolutions have not been implemented.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

94-22329 (E) 200594

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S/1994/600
19 May 1994

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 913 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 913 (1994) of 22 April 1994, the Security Council decided to remain actively seized of the situation in and around Gorazde and stated that it stood ready promptly to consider taking further measures as required. Significant developments on the ground make it necessary for me to submit the present report to the Council, which should be read against the background of document S/1994/555, in which I presented my views on the concept of "safe areas" and its effective implementation within the overall goal of restoring peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

II. BACKGROUND

2. The Security Council, in resolution 913 (1994), demanded the immediate conclusion of a cease-fire agreement, under the auspices of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in Gorazde and throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to an agreement on cessation of hostilities, and demanded that all parties comply strictly with such agreements. It called upon UNPROFOR to monitor the situation in Gorazde and the respect of any cease-fire agreement and disengagement of the military forces therein, including any measure to put heavy weapons of the parties under United Nations control. It also condemned the shelling and attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Gorazde and demanded the withdrawal of those forces and their weapons to a distance to be agreed by UNPROFOR, wherefrom they ceased to constitute a threat to the status of Gorazde as a safe area. The Security Council further called for an end to any provocative action by whomsoever committed in and around the safe areas, demanded the immediate release of all United Nations personnel held by the Bosnian Serb forces as well as the unimpeded freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and the removal of all obstacles thereto. It underlined the urgent need for an intensification of the efforts towards an overall political settlement agreed by all parties in the former Yugoslavia and in particular in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. As the Council is aware, I had on 18 April 1994 addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Mr. Manfred Worner, in which I requested him to obtain, at the earliest possible date, a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorize the Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery, mortar positions or tanks in or around the five safe areas of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica, that were determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets within those safe areas. On 22 April 1994, Mr. Worner informed me that on that day the North Atlantic Council had taken two decisions on the protection of safe areas. As regards the Gorazde safe area, the North Atlantic Council had decided, inter alia, that unless: (a) Bosnian Serb attacks immediately ceased; (b) their forces pulled back 3 kilometres from the centre of the city by 0001 hours GMT on 24 April 1994; and (c) from that same time and date United Nations forces, humanitarian relief convoys and medical assistance teams were free to enter Gorazde unimpeded and medical evacuations were permitted, CINCSOUTH was authorized to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other military targets within a 20-kilometre radius of the centre of Gorazde (but inside the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina), in accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council's decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993. That decision also called upon the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina not to undertake offensive military action from within that safe area.

4. In another decision, the North Atlantic Council had also agreed, inter alia, to establish a "military exclusion zone" (within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina) of 20 kilometres around Gorazde, which called for all Bosnian Serb heavy weapons, including tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons, to be withdrawn by 0001 hours GMT on 27 April 1994. It further decided that, after 0001 hours GMT on 27 April 1994, in the event of non-compliance, Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other Bosnian Serb military assets, as well as their direct and essential military support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munitions sites, would be subject to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council's decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993. The decision also called upon the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina not to undertake offensive military action from within the safe areas and, to this end, to cooperate with any UNPROFOR monitoring of their heavy weapons.

5. On 22 and 23 April 1994, my Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the UNPROFOR Force Commander, Lt-General Bertrand de Lapresle, met in Belgrade with the Bosnian Serb civilian and military authorities and leadership, at the invitation of President Slobodan Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia. As required by resolution 913 (1994), an agreement was reached at that meeting on an immediate and total cease-fire in and around Gorazde from 1000 hours GMT on 23 April 1994, and on the urgent deployment of an UNPROFOR battalion in an area with a 3-kilometre radius from the centre of Gorazde (defined as the centre of the main bridge on the Drina river) from which Bosnian Serb forces would be redeployed by 2200 hours GMT on 23 April 1994, in order for UNPROFOR to closely monitor,

supervise and report on the observance of the cease-fire by both parties. In addition, it was agreed that heavy weapons would be withdrawn, not later than 2200 hours GMT on 26 April 1994, out of an area with a 20-kilometre radius from the centre of Gorazde (but inside the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and out of range, so as not to constitute a threat to the Gorazde safe area, without prejudice to the procedures to be agreed subsequently in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 913 (1994). The agreement also included a guarantee of secure conditions for immediate medical evacuations from Gorazde and provisions for complete freedom of movement for all personnel of UNPROFOR and humanitarian organizations and for the immediate start of negotiations in good faith on all military matters in order to reduce tensions, achieve disengagement, create secure and peaceful conditions and provide for the humanitarian needs of the civilian population. The agreement further indicated that the implementation of the preceding measures would contribute to intensifying efforts towards achieving an overall political settlement agreed by all parties.

III. SITUATION IN GORAZDE

6. Despite a number of violations of the cease-fire attributable to both parties between the afternoon of 23 April and the morning of 25 April 1994, the cease-fire has generally been respected since the latter date, with only isolated and sporadic small arms fire. This was in no small measure due to the arrival in Gorazde, in the course of the night of 23-24 April, of a first UNPROFOR convoy. This first contingent included some 100 infantry, 40 medical and about 25 civil affairs and civilian police personnel and was led by the UNPROFOR Head of Civil Affairs and the Commander of Sector Sarajevo of UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command. They were subsequently reinforced to the total present strength of 432, including civilian personnel.

7. This rapid improvement in the military and humanitarian situation in and around Gorazde was achieved through the interposition of UNPROFOR between the opposing forces, the deployment of its soldiers, civilian and police staff within the urban areas on both banks of the Drina river, the evacuation by air of nearly 300 urgent medical cases, the arrival of humanitarian assistance convoys of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other ad hoc measures aimed at restoring security and confidence among the civilian population, including the Serb minority.

8. The withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from the 3-kilometre zone by 2200 hours GMT on 23 April 1994, was complicated by the need to separate the two opposing forces. Owing in part to delays in the arrival of the required UNPROFOR forces, which were caused largely by factors beyond the control of UNPROFOR, it took an additional day to complete the withdrawal of the main body of Serb forces that had been attacking the town.

9. While supervising the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from the 3-kilometre zone, UNPROFOR and NATO were also conducting ground investigations and air surveillance of the 20-kilometre zone. By the deadline of 2200 hours GMT on 26 April 1994, it was clear on the basis of the best information available that substantial compliance had occurred with respect to the required

withdrawal of heavy weapons. Of 32 sites visited in the 20-kilometre zone, all had been cleared of heavy weapons, apart from 3 weapons that were found to be immobilized. In subsequent patrols following the expiry of the deadline, three Bosnian Serb tanks and two anti-aircraft guns were found and escorted out of the zone. Investigation patrols continue.

10. In accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 913 (1994) and at UNPROFOR's request, the local Commander of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted information on two heavy weapons in his possession. UNPROFOR patrols, however, later found four additional undeclared heavy weapons (one anti-aircraft and three anti-tank weapons), which cast doubts on the accuracy of the information originally provided. Efforts continue to have the Bosnian Government's Army place all its heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control.

11. After their verification of the 20-kilometre zone in conjunction with the 26 April deadline, UNPROFOR forces were able to refocus attention on more intensive patrolling in the 3-kilometre zone. As early as 25 April 1994, small groups of Bosnian Serb militia were being encountered, particularly on the right bank of the Drina. When confronted with this information, the Bosnian Serb authorities stated that those persons were demobilized militia or police and had been left in the area to ensure the security of Bosnian Serb civilians. On 30 April, a serious incident occurred within the 3-kilometre exclusion zone, during which an UNPROFOR patrol twice came under fire from Bosnian Serb soldiers. UNPROFOR soldiers returned fire in self-defence, causing three casualties to the assailants.

12. On 3 May 1994, my Special Representative and the Force Commander met with Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to discuss the situation in Gorazde. Prime Minister Silajdzic emphasized that the presence of Bosnian Serb forces within the 3-kilometre area was not acceptable, and that full Bosnian Serb compliance with the total exclusion zone was a precondition for further negotiations. The Prime Minister also accused the Bosnian Serb side of introducing in that area civilian settlers who occupied houses abandoned by their legal owners who had been forcibly displaced during the recent offensive.

13. At a subsequent meeting the same day with the Bosnian Serb leader, Mr. Radovan Karadzic, my Special Representative emphasized the need for full and immediate compliance with all the terms of resolution 913 (1994) and the agreement reached at Belgrade. Mr. Karadzic asserted a need for Bosnian Serb militiamen to remain within the 3-kilometre exclusion zone on the right bank of the Drina, in order to protect Bosnian Serb civilians who allegedly originated from and were then returning to that area in the wake of the recent advance of Bosnian Serb forces. My Special Representative did not accept this reasoning and demanded that all armed and uniformed individuals be withdrawn forthwith from that zone.

14. As the situation on the ground did not improve, my Special Representative instructed the Head of Civil Affairs of UNPROFOR to proceed to Pale on 7 May 1994, for further talks with Mr. Karadzic. The immediate and total withdrawal of all armed and uniformed elements, whether soldiers or militiamen, who by then totalled some 200 to 250 within the 3-kilometre zone, in contravention of resolution 913 (1994) and of the agreement reached at Belgrade,

was again demanded. Mr. Karadzic was also informed that UNPROFOR military and civilian police personnel would take exclusive control of the area lying between the 23 April 1994 cease-fire line and the edge of the 3-kilometre zone. Mr. Karadzic undertook to instruct his military commanders to comply. No progress, however, was made with regard to the Bosnian Serb civilians who have settled within that zone.

15. In meetings held in Vienna and Sarajevo on 7 and 8 May 1994, President Alija Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic reaffirmed to the UNPROFOR Head of Civil Affairs that total withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from the 3-kilometre zone and a satisfactory solution to the problem of persons displaced within that zone by the recent Bosnian Serb offensive remained preconditions for other negotiations.

16. On 10 May 1994, my Special Representative wrote an urgent letter to Mr. Karadzic protesting, inter alia, against the continued presence of Bosnian Serb forces within the 3-kilometre exclusion zone, the unacceptable and repeated harassment and long delays or obstruction caused to UNPROFOR convoys travelling to and from Gorazde, the non-granting of clearances for medical evacuation helicopter flights and the denial of freedom of movement to United Nations civilian policemen from Sarajevo to Gorazde and within the Gorazde 3-kilometre zone. These disturbing developments cast doubt on the seriousness with which the Bosnian Serb side was treating Security Council resolution 913 (1994) and the agreement reached at Belgrade. There appears to be a pattern of defiance, which could endanger all the efforts made by my Special Representative and UNPROFOR to defuse the crisis at Gorazde.

17. Notwithstanding the fact that Bosnian Serb authorities agreed to their full freedom of movement, UNPROFOR personnel en route to and from Gorazde have been exposed to an increasing degree of harassment. This has included the blocking or administrative delay for up to five days at a Bosnian Serb army checkpoint at Rogatica of military resupply and other UNPROFOR convoys, including one transporting medical assistance from a non-governmental organization (NGO). Of even greater concern, such harassment has, on two separate occasions, included the temporary detention of UNPROFOR personnel and the theft of their equipment:

(a) At 1840 hours on 7 May 1994, the Canadian occupants of an UNPROFOR vehicle that had been held up by Bosnian Serbs at Rogatica for over 48 hours were physically detained. The vehicle was searched and a significant quantity of forward air control communications equipment and the weapons of the UNPROFOR officers were stolen. The officers were eventually released; however, as of 13 May 1994, none of the stolen equipment had been returned;

(b) On 12 May 1994, a three-vehicle United Kingdom convoy was stopped at gunpoint by Bosnian Serb troops at Podromanija, which is located between Rogatica and Gorazde. The weapons of the UNPROFOR personnel and some equipment were seized and the convoy commander (a British major) was forced at gunpoint to write a statement, which his captors deemed to be unacceptable. The Bosnian Serbs removed this officer to Rogatica where he was given another statement to sign and forced to read it aloud in front of a television camera. The convoy was released some hours later. The stolen weapons and equipment have not yet been returned.

18. Similar delays and related obstacles have been placed in the path of humanitarian assistance deliveries and evacuations. Despite promises to the contrary, it remains the case that UNPROFOR and humanitarian organizations do not enjoy complete freedom of movement to and from Gorazde and that secure and peaceful conditions for the provision of humanitarian needs to the civilian population have not yet been achieved.

19. On 12 May 1994, a renewed attempt was made at the local level to bring about the total withdrawal of Serb forces from the 3-kilometre zone on the right bank of the Drina. An arrangement was reached with both parties that should have entered into force at 1100 hours GMT on 13 May 1994, whereby the Bosnian Army would have vacated a position it presently occupies on a feature some 1.2 kilometres from the centre of Gorazde on the right bank of the Drina, forward of the 23 April 1994 cease-fire line, and would have redeployed behind that line; within 24 hours all Bosnian Serb forces, including armed military, armed militia and armed civilians, would have withdrawn out of the 3-kilometre zone on the right bank; UNPROFOR would have verified the fulfilment of the above redeployment and withdrawal, would have been entitled to search throughout the exclusion zone on the right bank and would have occupied permanently the position indicated above, after redeployment of the Bosnian Army forces presently occupying it. UNPROFOR also recommended, as already mentioned in paragraph 14 above, that the entire area lying between the cease-fire line and the edge of the 3-kilometre zone on the right bank of the Drina remain demilitarized and under its exclusive interim control. Although on 13 May 1994 the local Bosnian Government Army commander signed the document outlining the above arrangements and actually withdrew his forces from the position they occupied, the local Bosnian Serb liaison officer stated that he had no authority at his level to enter into this agreement. As a result, the Bosnian Army reoccupied the position it had vacated.

20. On 14 May 1994, my Special Representative spoke with President Milosevic, who had assisted in the convening of the Belgrade meeting on 22 and 23 April 1994. President Milosevic assured him that he would do his utmost to bring about the prompt conclusion as well as the full implementation of the arrangements described in the preceding paragraph.

21. As of 18 May 1994, the situation in Gorazde remains one of stalemate, with both parties making claims over the right bank of the Drina river, within the 3-kilometre exclusion zone. While the number of Bosnian Serb militia within the area has been reduced by approximately 100, to a total of 100 to 150 personnel, these militia have, to date, demonstrated no willingness to withdraw outside the 3-kilometre zone. Tensions continue to remain high within Gorazde and, on 17 May 1994, a Ukrainian peace-keeper was killed by an intruder in the UNPROFOR camp at Vitkovici.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

22. Despite the limitations of its mandate and military resources, UNPROFOR, since the Sarajevo market massacre on 5 February 1994, has played a major stabilizing role and contributed to normalizing the situation, particularly in and around Sarajevo, along the entire confrontation line between the Bosnian

Croat and Bosnian government forces (following the 23 February cease-fire agreement and the subsequent successful political negotiations), in Gorazde as described above and in Brcko and the Posavina corridor with the deployment of military observers since 7 May 1994. A peace-keeping force such as UNPROFOR cannot, however, be expected indefinitely to preserve such achievements or indeed ensure compliance with partial cease-fires, military exclusion zones and ultimatums issued by regional organizations, unless early progress is made towards, as a minimum, an agreement on a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a halt to the movement of military forces, equipment and supplies. Such an agreement would, in turn, create a climate conducive to the resumption of substantive political negotiations. The continued erosion of confidence in, and ultimately the undermining of, the achievements attained so far is unavoidable unless diplomatic efforts are intensified and brought together, as called for in paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 913 (1994).

23. On 12 May 1994, I met in Paris with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen, as well as with my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi and the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Lt-General Bertrand de Lapresle. I was accompanied by the Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs and for Peace-Keeping Operations, Mr. Marrack Goulding and Mr. Kofi Annan. We reviewed the situation prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and agreed that, as a first step, it was imperative that my Special Representative be given every possible support to resolve the present difficulties encountered by UNPROFOR in and around Gorazde in accordance with resolution 913 (1994) and with the Belgrade agreement mentioned in paragraph 3 above. We further agreed that the parties should engage, under the auspices of UNPROFOR, in negotiations leading to an immediate agreement on a general cease-fire and a comprehensive agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

24. I was, therefore, encouraged by the joint communiqué issued in Geneva on 13 May 1994 at the end of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Germany and Greece and European Commissioner Hans van den Broek, comprising the Troika of the European Union, as well as of France, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Together with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, they reviewed the serious situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, I share their assessment that the negotiating process has been set back in the wake of the recent offensive on the safe area of Gorazde. I welcome their call on the parties to conclude a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and to resume in parallel, without preconditions, serious efforts to reach a political settlement. Both these actions are considered by the Ministers as essential immediate steps and I fully concur.

25. As regards an agreement on the comprehensive cessation of hostilities, I am requesting my Special Representative and the UNPROFOR Force Commander to approach the parties immediately to bring about an early meeting and, it is hoped, an agreement on this priority issue. I believe paragraph 1 of resolution 913 (1994) gives a clear mandate to UNPROFOR in this regard. I have also requested them to take into account the elements underlined by the Foreign

Ministers, namely the separation of forces, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the interposition of UNPROFOR troops. I further welcome the call by the Foreign Ministers for a further reinforcement of UNPROFOR if it is to perform its tasks adequately in the protection of safe areas and in support of the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have also noted and fully subscribe to the view expressed by the Foreign Ministers that the agreement on the comprehensive cessation of hostilities should be for a minimum period of four months, with provision for extension. During that period, every effort must be made to achieve an overall political settlement agreed by all parties. The urgency of this objective has been underlined in recent days by statements on behalf of the Governments of a number of major contributors to UNPROFOR that they will withdraw some or all of their contingents if substantial progress towards an overall settlement is not made within the next two months.

26. I would therefore request the support of the Security Council for the positions described in the present report and would welcome, in particular, the Council calling for the immediate and total compliance with its resolution 913 (1994) and with the Belgrade agreement concluded between my Special Representative and the Bosnian Serb authorities. The Security Council may also wish to request UNPROFOR to continue to proceed urgently with its efforts to achieve a comprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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S/1994/601
20 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication that he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 19 May 1994 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

In a statement by the President of the Security Council on 31 March 1994 (S/PRST/1994/13), the Director General of IAEA was invited

> "to report further to the Security Council on the question of completion of the inspection activities agreed between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 15 February 1994, and on follow-on inspections required to maintain continuity of safeguards and to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded".

Subsequent to this statement, the Agency has had several rounds of correspondence with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was eventually agreed that a team of three inspectors would proceed to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to complete some of the activities at the radiochemical laboratory that inspectors were not enabled to perform during the March inspection and to perform activities required to maintain continuity of safeguards knowledge, such as maintenance of cameras and exchange of seals. The team arrived in Pyongyang on 17 May and is expected to complete these inspection activities by 24 May. At the radiochemical laboratory the inspectors have now been enabled to perform safeguards measures that had been agreed with the Agency (gamma mapping and smear sampling from the plutonium glove-box area). The inspectors have also serviced all cameras and exchanged some seals. The inspection activities continue.

I am obliged, however, at this stage, to report a new important development. This relates to the refuelling of the 5MWe experimental nuclear power reactor. On 19 April the Democratic People's Republic of Korea notified IAEA of its intention to carry out "at an early date" the refuelling of that reactor. A refuelling of this reactor has been envisaged by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for over a year.

As early as February 1993 the Agency provided the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with information about safeguards measures required in connection with such refuelling. The Agency has throughout made clear to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that specific safeguards activities related to the selection, segregation and securing of certain fuel rods, are indispensable at the time of the core discharge operation. This is to enable the Agency to verify through measurements, at a later date, that no fuel in the reactor has been diverted in the past. The Agency needs to verify that the fuel discharged is the first core of the reactor, as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has declared to be the case.

In its recent correspondence on this subject with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Agency has emphasized that, if the inspection activities do not take place as required during the core discharge campaign, any subsequent measurements would be of no value, and the information necessary for the Agency

to verify that, in the past, there has been no diversion of nuclear material would be irretrievably lost. The Agency, therefore, urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not to initiate the core discharge campaign without enabling Agency inspectors to take the proposed measures. To proceed without these measures the Agency stated, would be a serious violation of the Safeguards Agreement and would maintain the uncertainty that now exists about the amount of nuclear material that exists in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has continued to declare, however, that it has a "unique status" and is "not duty-bound at all to fully implement the obligations of the safeguards agreement". In line with this reasoning, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea expresses the view that activities related to the selection, segregation and securing of fuel rods are activities that cannot be permitted. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has signalled a readiness to allow Agency inspectors to take measures that would enable the Agency to verify that the discharged fuel is not diverted, but will not allow measures to verify whether diversion of the fuel has taken place in the past.

The Agency has continued to make clear to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Safeguards Agreement, held to be valid by the IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference as well as by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, is the sole basis for the performance of IAEA safeguards activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Under that agreement, IAEA must take measures to enable it to verify that all nuclear material subject to safeguards is in fact under safeguards and has not been diverted.

On 12 May, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea informed IAEA that it had already started the refuelling campaign and that it would permit the inspection activities requested by IAEA (selection and securing of certain fuel rods for later measurement) "if the further round of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America talks would take place even during the core refuelling operation, enabling us [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] to remove the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status within the framework of a package solution to the nuclear issue".

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's telex added that "we have just started the core discharge operation and so the opportunity for selecting and securing of fuel rods still remains".

Until the receipt of that telex, the Agency had assumed that the core discharge campaign had been deferred and had expressed its readiness for discussions about technical arrangements relating to the required safeguards measures. In the light of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's telex of 12 May, the Agency instructed its team of inspectors to verify whether the discharge of fuel from the reactor was still at an early stage, allowing the Agency to assess whether technical discussions about the required safeguards measures could still be meaningful.

The inspection team has now confirmed that the core discharge has started and has reported on the extent of the core discharge that has already taken

place. The Agency has concluded that a further discharge of fuel rods would jeopardize the possibility of the Agency applying the safeguards measures necessary to verify whether any fuel has been diverted in the past.

By a telex today, 19 May, IAEA has confirmed to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the discharge of fuel without the safeguards measures requested by IAEA constitutes a serious violation of the safeguards agreement. It has requested that arrangements be made promptly for the necessary safeguards measures and urged that, until these are in place, further discharge should be deferred. The assessment of the Agency is that, although some fuel rods are damaged and may need to be taken out of the reactor, there appears to be no overriding technical reasons that prevent the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from deferring further discharge activity until arrangements for the necessary safeguards measures have been made.

At the time of writing the present report, it still seems possible to implement the safeguards measures required. Should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continue the discharge operation without these measures, however, it would result in irreparable loss of the Agency's ability to verify whether all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is in fact under safeguards and that no such material has been diverted.

In view of the above, the Agency has proposed sending a team of officials immediately to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to discuss arrangements necessary for the implementation of the safeguards measures required in connection with the discharge operation.

I should be grateful if this letter could be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1994/602
23 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have long refrained from providing counter-arguments to the countless letters and "fact-sheets" routinely sent into circulation by the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, considering it a waste of time to refute propaganda. But the striking absurdity of the accusation against the Republic of Armenia of annexationist plans in relation to the Azerbaijani Republic made in the letter of 17 May 1994 (S/1994/591) from Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mr. Hassan Hassanov to the President of the Security Council compels me to bring to your attention the misinformation this letter contains.

Leaving aside the overall groundlessness of Mr. Hassanov's accusations and the unidentified nature of his information sources, I would like to illustrate my argument with several examples.

"Airudzi" (Horsemen), which Mr. Hassanov believes is a charitable alliance, was a jockey club that ceased to exist in 1991 as a result of financial difficulties. Even if the club still operated, it would have been extremely hard for it to find its place under the auspices of the "Armenian monarchic party" for the simple reason that no such entity exists in Armenia. Indeed, the last royal institution in Armenia existed in the fourteenth century.

As has been repeatedly stated, the Armenian regular army does not participate in the Nagorny-Karabakh-Azerbaijan conflict, and Armenian conscripts are not sent outside the borders of the Republic of Armenia; therefore, they cannot be exempted from "military service in the zone of military operations in Nagorny Karabakh". As far as the Armenian volunteers are concerned, namely, those people who have chosen of their own free will to expose themselves to the dangers of war to defend the Armenian population, obviously they would hardly think of settling down in the temporarily captured territories that are to be returned according to both the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and Russian peace plans signed by Nagorny Karabakh.

The last, but most important point, is that the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister misrepresents the facts by speaking about "the unwillingness of the Armenian side to proceed to a peaceful settlement of the bloody conflict", whereas in reality the facts speak for themselves, attesting to the opposite.

Paying lip-service to peace efforts, the Azeri side has repeatedly rejected the CSCE peace plans and has jeopardized the most recent peace plan by abandoning the Russian Federation-brokered cease-fire talks in Moscow on 17 May. This plan provides for a reliable mechanism for disengagement of combatants through introduction of peace-keeping forces into the conflict area, followed by the withdrawal of the Karabakh self-defence units from the captured territories and the return of refugees. It has been signed by both Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh. However, the Azerbaijani side has failed to prove its genuine commitment to the establishment of peace.

Instead, it has chosen to come up with groundless accusations against the Republic of Armenia, blaming it for "blatant disregard for Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993)", which, in fact, call on the sides to take those very steps towards peace that are reflected in both the CSCE peace plan and the Russian Federation-brokered cease-fire agreement.

This is being done when the CSCE Minsk Group, through the tireless efforts of its Chairman, is trying to integrate the cease-fire plan into its comprehensive peace settlement, and the world community is waiting for Azerbaijan to put its pen to either of these documents, thus making the long-awaited peace a reality.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Alexander ARZOUMANIAN
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/49/163
S/1994/603
23 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 72 of the preliminary list*

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Letter dated 20 May 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter of Mr. Anatoly M. Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, concerning the situation in Crimea.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 72 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volodymyr D. KHANDOGY
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Ukraine
to the United Nations

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

ANNEX

Letter dated 20 May 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine to the Secretary-General

On 20 May 1994, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of the Republic of Crimea adopted a decision on renewal of the validity of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 5 May 1992. That act is aimed at the change of the legal status of the autonomous Republic of Crimea as an integral part of Ukraine. By that act, the legislative body of the autonomous Republic of Crimea, which is an inalienable integral part of Ukraine, has violated the Constitution of Ukraine, its national legislation in force, including the Law of Ukraine on the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as the Law on the Delimitation of Powers between the State Power Authorities of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea, of 28 April 1992.

This illegal decision, provoked by the irresponsible policy of the present leadership of the Crimea and aimed at undermining the constitutional order of Ukraine and its territorial integrity, cannot be qualified as anything other than an obvious attempt of separatist forces to put the internal political stability of Ukraine at risk and provoke tension in the relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. By that act, a threat to peace and stability in the region and in the whole of Europe has been created, and this may have far-reaching negative consequences in view of the present tense situation in this part of the continent.

Today, when the European States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have agreed on the exceptional importance of preserving and strengthening, without reservation, the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of existing frontiers as a pledge of peace and security in Europe, such separatist ambitions of the leadership of the Republic of Crimea may result in further dilution and erosion of those fundamental principles of international law on which European stability rests.

From the very first days of the existence of Ukraine as an independent State, the President, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and its Government have exerted maximum efforts for the all-round social, economic and cultural development of the Crimea. The Crimean region was granted the status of an autonomous republic within Ukraine, the Decree on the Open Economy Regime in the Territory of the Republic of Crimea was adopted, a number of other important arrangements concerning the stabilization of the economy of the Crimea and full respect for the cultural and other rights of the population of the Crimea have been made. Ukraine indeed implements the policy of renewal of historical truth concerning deported peoples, and facilitates the return of Crimean Tatars and other peoples to their historic motherland. In other words, the leadership of Ukraine has tried to settle the issue of Crimean autonomy through all this period of time, thoroughly, flexibly and on fully legitimate grounds. To our regret, instead of making the most efficient use of the available legal opportunities to address the emerging challenges, the present leadership of the Crimea has chosen the road of extremism and blunt confrontation.

The position of Ukraine as concerns the so-called "Crimean issue" has repeatedly been communicated to all our foreign partners and to international organizations and has enjoyed full understanding and support on the part of the world community. I hope, Mr. Secretary-General, for your personal understanding and support of the legitimate actions of the Government of Ukraine in averting possible negative consequences of the anticonstitutional decision adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of the Crimea. Ukraine reserves the right, in case of further escalation of the situation as a consequence of irresponsible steps of extremist forces in the Crimea, to take all necessary measures to ultimately ensure the State's territorial integrity as provided for by its Constitution and the laws in force, in observance of the norms of international law.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoly ZLENKO
Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine

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S/1994/604
23 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MAY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have taken note of your report dated 18 May 1994 on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (S/1994/588), on the basis of which they have completed the review provided for in paragraph 2 of resolution 911 (1994).

The members of the Council reaffirm their intention to review again the situation in Liberia, including the role played by UNOMIL, on or before 30 June 1994, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 911 (1994).

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
President of the
Security Council

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S/1994/605
24 May 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF VENEZUELA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to inform him that, under paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 883 (1993), concerning additional sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Government of Venezuela has communicated its import to all the competent Venezuelan organizations and has taken all the necessary steps to ensure full compliance with the provisions of the above-mentioned Council resolution.

94-22590 (E) 240594 240594

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Security Council

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S/1994/606
23 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter, dated 18 May 1994, addressed to you by President Nelson Mandela in response to your letter of 10 May 1994.

I should be grateful if the text of the enclosed letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) V. R. W. STEWARD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 18 May 1994 from the President of the Republic of South Africa addressed to the President of the Security Council

Thank you very much for your letter dated 10 May 1994 in which you conveyed the Security Council's congratulations on the conclusion of the first democratic and multi-party elections in South Africa, as well as on my election to the office of President of the Republic of South Africa.

On behalf of all the people of South Africa and myself, I wish to assure the Security Council, and you in particular, of our appreciation and gratitude for your unstinting support and encouragement.

The successful conclusion of the electoral process and political change in South Africa have certainly brought an end to the need for international sanctions to be imposed on the country. In order to allow South Africa to resume its rightful place in the international community, I therefore wish to call upon the United Nations Security Council to consider revoking all the remaining sanctions still enforced against the country at the earliest possible occasion.

(Signed) N. R. MANDELA

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GENERAL

S/1994/607
24 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MAY 1994 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violations by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 2 February 1994, at 0900 hours, 16 Iraqi military personnel were seen replacing troops in no man's land, at the geographic coordinates of NC592330 on the map of Kani Sheikh, south of border pillar 40/1.

2. On 3 February 1994, at 0600 hours, anti-revolutionary elements who had penetrated Iranian territory planted an anti-personnel mine at the geographic coordinates of NF4422 on the map of Alavan. The mine was discovered and defused by Iranian forces.

3. On 3 February 1994, an Iraqi IFA vehicle, carrying 15 passengers and trailing an anti-aircraft weapon, left the township of Havasi at the geographic coordinates of NC555316 on the map of Kani Sheikh and stopped at the geographic coordinates of NC589317 of Kani Sheikh, south-west of border pillars 40 and 40A.

4. On 4 February 1994, at 2330 hours, 40 anti-revolutionary elements, armed with Kalashnikov and other light weapons and wearing masks on their faces, crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographic coordinates of NE832706 on the map of Baneh, north of border pillar 2/99 and the Rostami sentry post. They barricaded the road at the axis of Ashtarabad-Kookh Halaleh and Siranband and proceeded to demand money from drivers of vehicles passing through. They left for Iraq after they received the money.

5. On 5 February 1994, at 1745 hours, Iraqi forces, stationed at the Esmailkhan sentry post opposite the border sentry post of Darbandjoogh of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographic coordinates of NC5310045100, fired single shots and volleys from a position within no man's land at Kohneh Rig Height and north-west of border pillar 44/2. They fired in the direction of the northern part of the Darbandjoogh sentry post for 15 minutes.

6. On 6 February 1994, at 1730 hours, 24 Iraqi military personnel were seen training in the vicinity of the Al-Abbas sentry post at the geographic

coordinates of NC589317 on the map of Kani Sheikh, south-west of border pillars 40 and 40A.

7. On 6 February 1994, 15 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated 12 kilometres inside Iranian territory north-east of border pillar 118. They entered Lavin village at the geographic coordinates of NF1858 on the map of Piranshahr and delivered speeches against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

8. On 6 February 1994, at 0810 hours, an Iraqi navigation vessel left the port of Basra and sailed towards the sea after passing through Khorramshahr port's operation area.

9. On 6 February 1994, at 2210 hours, a ship left the port of Basra and sailed the waters opposite the operation area of Khorramshahr before it moved in the direction of the sea. The dark did not allow identification of the ship.

10. On 8 February 1994, at 0700 hours, a Toyota vehicle carrying three Iraqi passengers and a Grinoff gun was seen in no man's land, west of border pillar 22/31 at Bajileh Sharhani at the geographic coordinates of QA285824 on the map of Nahr-e-Anbar.

11. On 8 February 1994, at 1025 hours, 12 Iraqi military personnel were seen carrying a number of boxes of ammunition up Height 408 at the geographic coordinates of ND390127, west of border pillar 56/1.

12. On 8 February 1994, at 1130 hours, 10 Iraqi military personnel armed with weapons and other equipments were seen in the vicinity of Lajmeh sentry post at the geographic coordinates of NC641231 on the map of Kani Sheikh, south-west of border pillar 39/1.

13. On 9 February 1994, at 1030 hours, Iraqi military personnel installed a 60mm-mortar gun on the roof of the Dowaleh Sharif sentry post at the geographic coordinates of NC548416 on the map of Sumar in no man's land, west of border pillar 44.

14. On 10 February 1994, at 1740 hours, 15 Iraqi trailers carrying tanks at the geographic coordinates of QA5036 north of Hoor-al-Howeizeh left the area after unloading the tanks.

15. On 10 February 1994, at 1900 hours, Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC711225 on the map of Halaleh in no man's land south of Mount Ghalalem and west of border pillar 39, fired 20 tracer bullets.

16. On 12 February 1994, at 1730 hours, four Iraqi tanks were stationed at the geographic coordinates of QA4547 on the map of Yebis, west of border pillar 21/21.

17. On 13 February 1994, at 0100 hours, 11 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the villages of Massoo, at the geographic coordinates of NF5072, Daiman, at the geographic coordinates of

NF5076, and Bairambooni, at the geographic coordinates of NF4474, on the map of Mahabad. They then proceeded to subject the villagers to extortion.

18. On 14 February 1994, at 1640 hours, seven Iraqi military personnel were seen dismantling a trench at the geographic coordinates of NC838161 on the map of Halaleh at Meimak Heights, west of border pillar 35/6.

19. On 14 February 1994, at 1835 hours, a number of Iraqis were seen at the geographic coordinates of NC8315 on the map of Halaleh at Meimak Heights, west of border pillar 35/6.

20. On 15 February 1994, at 0830 hours, 25 Iraqi military personnel were seen training at the geographic coordinates of NC598317 on the map of Kani Sheikh in no man's land, east of the Al-Abbas sentry post and west of border pillar 39/8 and south of border pillars 40 and 40A.

21. On 15 February 1994, at 1550 hours, a Panamanian ship with unidentified cargo left the port of Basra and sailed towards the sea after passing through the operation area of the port of Khorramshahr.

22. On 17 February 1994, at 0700 hours, a commercial vessel, the Shahoo, left the port of Basra and after passing through the area of operation of the port of Khorramshahr sailed towards the sea.

23. On 18 February 1994, at 1135 hours a number of Iraqi military personnel were seen installing barbed wire at the geographic coordinates of PB2543 on the map of Koohe Toonel in no man's land, south of border pillar 25/11.

24. On 19 February 1994, at 2200 hours, 30 anti-revolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the village of Gherteegh Sepian at the geographic coordinates of NF2471 on the map of Naghadeh, south-west of Pasweh. They spotted some villagers whom they beat up and subjected to extortion. After getting some money, they returned to Iraqi territory.

25. On 20 February 1994, at 0900 hours, 20 Iraqis were seen training at the geographic coordinates of NC5831 on the map of Kani Sheikh, south of Height 130 and the Iraqi sentry post of Al-Abbas, south-west of border pillars 40 and 40A.

26. On 22 February 1994, at 2000 hours, Iraqi forces stationed at the Althamood sentry post at the geographic coordinates of NC466547 on the map of Sumar and southern Naftshahr in no man's land, north-west of border pillar 44/7 and south-west of border pillar 44/8 and south-east of border pillar 44/9, fired a sonar bullet. They then proceeded to fire with light weapons at Iranian territory for four minutes.

27. On 26 February 1994, at 0900 hours, 16 Iraqi military personnel were seen training in the vicinity of Iraq's Al-Abbas sentry post at the geographic coordinates of NC589317 on the map of Kani Sheikh, south of Height 130 and south-west of border pillars 40 and 40A.

28. On 26 February 1994, at 1630 hours, the sound of the explosion of four mortar shells were heard at the geographic coordinates of 390127 on the map of

Khosravi, west of border pillar 56/1 and Darbandjoogh in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

29. On 26 February 1994, 12 anti-revolutionary elements who had penetrated Iranian territory entered the village of Banavieh at the geographic coordinates of NE4086 on the map of Sardasht, south of Zinosheikhi and east of Koohe Nori and border pillar 105. They returned to Iraq after being pursued by Iranian forces.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gholamali KHOSHROO
Deputy Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/608
24 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MAY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the resolution adopted by the Government of Israel on 22 May 1994, concerning events in Rwanda.

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gad YAACOBI
Permanent Representative

94-22660 (E) 250594 25/05/94

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Annex

Resolution of the Government of Israel
concerning events in Rwanda

The Government of Israel is shocked by the genocide being carried out in Rwanda and by the murder of hundreds of thousands of innocent people.

The Jewish people, who endured the most bitter experience of the Nazi holocaust, and their country - the State of Israel - cannot stand idly by in the face of the horror in Rwanda.

The Government of Israel calls on the international community to act urgently to stop the massacre and announces that it is prepared to take part in humanitarian activities to rescue people in this unfortunate country.

The Cabinet has requested that the Foreign Minister examine proposals for humanitarian assistance, including the dispatch of medical teams to Rwanda.

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/164
S/1994/609
25 May 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 38 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you as follows:

During the night of Friday, 20 May 1994 and the following morning, an Israeli commando unit abducted the Lebanese national Mustafa Dirani from his home in the village of Qasr Naba, Baalbek District, in the north-eastern part of the Bekaa Valley. The unit used two very advanced military helicopters, which jammed Lebanese military radar systems and entered Lebanese airspace from the direction of the sea to the east of the town of Jbeil (Byblos). The unit unloaded four military vehicles a few miles from Mr. Dirani's home and then set out from there for a point close to the house. The Israeli soldiers broke into the house, bound Mr. Dirani's wife and brother and drugged Mustafa Dirani and took him to Israel.

The Government of Lebanon strongly condemns this fresh Israeli act of aggression, which represents a flagrant violation of its national sovereignty and is incompatible with the most elementary principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the International Bill of Human Rights.

At a time when there are increasing contacts and stepped-up negotiations for the achievement of peaceful solutions in the region, the Israeli violation of Lebanon's national security poses a direct threat to the peace process in the Middle East.

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* A/49/50/Rev.1.

The Government of Lebanon urges the United Nations, in particular the members of the Security Council, to take speedy action for the immediate release and repatriation of the Lebanese national abducted, Mustafa Dirani.

Lebanon reserves its right to call for a meeting of the Security Council to consider this flagrant Israeli act of aggression against it.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 38 of the provisional list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/610
25 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of South Africa, in particular resolutions 282 (1970), 418 (1977), 421 (1977), 558 (1984) and 591 (1986),

Welcoming the first all-race multiparty election and the establishment of a united, democratic, non-racial government of South Africa, which was inaugurated on 10 May 1994,

Taking note of the letter of 18 May 1994 from President Nelson R. Mandela of the Republic of South Africa (S/1994/606, annex),

Stressing the urgent need to facilitate the process of reintegration of South Africa in the international community, including the United Nations systems,

1. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to terminate forthwith the mandatory arms embargo and other restrictions related to South Africa imposed by resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977;

2. Decides also to end forthwith all other measures against South Africa contained in resolutions of the Security Council, in particular those referred to in resolutions 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970, 558 (1984) of 13 December 1984 and 591 (1986) of 28 November 1986;

3. Decides further to dissolve the Committee of the Security Council established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, effective from the date of the adoption of the present resolution;

4. Invites all States to consider reflecting the provisions of this resolution as appropriate in their legislation.

94-22838 (E) 250594 26/05/94